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It is risky to read Noam Chomsky's political writings during dreary winter
months. He continually reminds us of the extent of human suffering and
cruelty throughout the world. His meticulous documentation of America's
ruthless foreign policy triggers uneasy shame.2 Even if one opposes much of
what the American Government and American corporations have done abroad
in our name, one can hardly resist the benefits, be they in lower clothing and
1Professor of Law; Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
B.A., Princeton University. J.D., University of Chicago Law School. I thank Noam
Chomsky, Sheldon Gelman, Samuel Gorovitz, Brain Bix, Steve Lazarus, David Snyder,
and Kunal Parker for their assistance, particularly their disagreements. The
Commentary attributes several statements to Professor Chomsky without supporting
textual documentation; such comments emerged from our personal discussions and
correspondence. Of course, I remain solely accountable for any errors. Copyright by
James G. Wilson and the Cleveland State Law Review.
2 See NOAM CHOMSKY, WORLD ORDERS OLD AND NEW (1994). Chomsky is far from
alone. One need barely dig beneath the mass media to find numerous tales of horror;
see Charles Bowden, While You Were Sleeping: In Juarez, Mexico, photographers expose the
violent realities offree trade, HARPER's, Dec., 1996, at 44.
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gas prices or higher stock markets.3 As a law professor who has not practiced
public interest law for some years, I do not believe I am doing all that I can to
rectify the situation. I think more often about my pension than the widespread
killings in East Timor 4 or Guatemala 5 that our government encouraged and
abetted. My family is far more important to me than abstract conceptions ofjustice; I do not give away much of my relatively handsome income to the
downtrodden. Yet my dwindling compassion seems downright maudlin when
compared to the harshness of the Clinton-Gingrich regime, particularly its
recent "Welfare Reform" Act.6
Such depressing thoughts, which could easily be extended in numerous
directions, can become so incapacitating that one wants to put Chomsky's work
down. Chomsky never has let such personal doubts or moral ambiguities
render him silent. After all, he has benefited from teaching at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, which was largely funded by the Pentagon during the
1950s and 60s.7 Far more importantly, Chomsky has never given up hope,
believing there are ample opportunities for humane change. He is even
tentatively optimistic.8 It is worth remembering that a written work has a life
of its own, possibly being persuasive despite its author's inevitable
shortcomings.
At first glance, Chomsky seems of little help in evaluating the United States
Supreme Court's use of judicial review. Over the decades, his political analysis
has primarily focused on American foreign policy, an area the Supreme Court
3Professor Chomsky questions whether the average American actually benefits
from the American empire. It is very hard to resolve that issue. For example, it costs a
great deal more than in most other countries for parents to get a quality education for
their children. This dilemma pressures them to make risky contributions to the capital
markets to protect their children. In turn, many of these contributions are extremely
demoralizing. Many of us seek the best possible rate of return, searching for virtual
monopolies or companies that exploit labor to intolerable degrees; see Ted C. Fishman,
The Joys of Global Investing: Shipping Homes the Fruits of Misery, HARPER'S, Feb., 1997 at
35.
4 Noam Chomsky, East Timorand World Order, in POWERS & PROSPECTS 204-221 (1996)(United States supported Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 that slaughtered
60,000 people within the first few months).
5 EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT 75 (1988) ("the
number of civilians murdered between 1978 and 1985 may have approached 100,000,
with a style of killing reminiscent of Pol Pot.").
6 Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and
Children-Welfare Services, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
7 NoAM CHOMSKY, CLASS WARFARE: INTERVIEWS WITH DAVID BARSAMIAN 99 (1996)
[hereinafter, CHOMSKY, CLASS WARFARE].
8CHOMSIy, Preface, in POWERS & PROSPECTS, supra note 4, at xi.
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generally has left to the elected branches' discretion.9 Nor is it easy to see how
the Court would or should play a major role in foreign affairs. Perhaps the
judiciary could enforce the War Powers Resolution 10 a bit more rigorously, but
Congress can alter such judicial efforts in this field through statute or treaty.
Many international issues are appropriately beyond the Court's effective
power. Who wants nine unelected, isolated Justices, having no direct contact
with the citizenry, the intelligence agencies, or foreign officials, determining
whether, when, and how we should bomb Serbia or Iraq (to take two recent
examples)?
Chomsky's belief in anarchism presents a more fundamental problem.
Anarchism seems inconsistent with the idea of a court system, much less any
activist conception of judicial review. For those of us with a more dismal view
of human nature than Chomsky, anarchism appears to be not only premature,
but also misguided. For the foreseeable future we must have a Leviathan; the
primary questions are its form and character. But Chomsky has acknowledged
that immediate problems, particularly private power's world-wide
dominance, necessitate strong government. He is willing to devise
intermediate solutions that conflict with his long-term goal of humane
anarchism.11 Chomsky's anarchism remains an inspirational "vision," not an
immediate "goal."12
Aside from anarchism, many of his norms, insights, and proposals are
sufficiently incremental and traditional to generate a legal structure that
resembles the current system in many ways. Chomsky believes in the concept
of "rights."13 For him, the Enlightenment and classical liberalism are sources of
9Although Chief Justice Marshall established a broad scope of judicial review, he
did not significantly extend constitutional judicial review to the conduct of foreign
affairs:
[Many] subjects are political: They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the execu-
tive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived, by
adverting to the act of congress establishing the department of foreign
affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform
precisely to the will of the president... The acts of such an officer, as an
officer, can never be examinable by the courts.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).
1050 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (1973).
1 1 CHOMSKY, Goals and Visions, in POWERS & PROSPECTS, supra note 4, at 71.
12 Id.
13 It is also hard to reconcile anarchism with a strong theory of rights. In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that one cannot have a "right" without a
"remedy." 5 U.S. 137, 163 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 23). For
example, humans have no meaningful right to free speech unless an institution exists
that can use coercive sanctions to stop those who are violating their rights. People need
a hierarchical, governmental court to determine when their rights have been violated
and to create sanctions to protect those rights. They also need some form of an Executive
branch to enforce such sanctions as damages, injunctions, or imprisonment. In addition,
courts must determine and define which human actions are "rights" that deserve legal
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 441 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
edification and inspiration. 14 At least for now, he is relatively satisfied with the
basic form of America's written Constitution. One need not accept Chomsky's
ultimate goal of anarchism to benefit from many of his political insights and
his empirical verifications of United States-inspired violence.
Chomsky is now closely analyzing many aspects of America's domestic
political and economic culture. In his article that immediately precedes this
Commentary, he discussed Big Business' satisfaction with the Clinton
administration. 15 Referring to thinkers like Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson,
Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Dewey, Chomsky traced an intellectual history
of arguments (supported by facts) explaining why societies should always fear
the wealthy and powerful.16 He concluded that America and the rest of the
world have become increasingly dominated by large corporations, which he
labels "private tyrannies" and "totalitarian."17 He has used similarly
provocative rhetoric elsewhere: "Transnational corporations now have an
enormous role in the world economy. These are just incredible private
tyrannies. They make totalitarian states look mild by comparison." 18
Chomsky's analysis raises several interrelated questions. Is it useful to label
large corporations as "private tyrannies" and "totalitarian?" Do these
corporations, whatever their precise nature, actually dominate (or even
control) the American economic and political/legal systems? Do private
corporations serve the "common good" or are they the most dangerous faction?
At this point in history, are they a greater threat or at least a more immediate
threat to our liberty and tranquillity than our formal government? What role
can courts play, if any, in combating this international concentration of
corporate power (both in the aggregate and within a particular corporation)?
Although Chomsky has never discussed judicial review in any detail, he
recently made several interesting observations. He believes America's
governmental structure remains acceptable, even desirable, even though all
three federal branches have not just failed to protect us from private power's
protection. Some authority must have the power to declare what is a properly
promulgated "law" that creates a lawful right.
In theory, courts could have power to declare all rights. But if one believes that the
doctrine of Separation of Powers best prevents the type of tyranny that arises from
concentrating power in one set of hands, a rights-protecting society also needs a separate
Legislative branch to make most laws protecting particular rights. Elections are another
necessary defense against governmental tyranny. In summary, the protection of rights
requires a government consisting of separate legislative, executive, and judicial
branches that are ultimately accountable to the People through elections.
14 Chomsky, Goals & Visions, in POWERS & PROSPECTS, supra note 4, at 71.
15 Noam Chomsky, Consent without Consent: Reflections on the Theory and Practice of
Democracy, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. at 416.
161d. at 420.
17 d. at 434.
1 8 CHOMSKY, CLASS WARFARE, supra note 7, at 39.
[Vol. 44:439
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excesses but instead have devoted far too much of their energy and power to
enhancing private power.1 9 The constitutional text creates a unique
relationship between the Supreme Court and private power. Because the Court
is staffed by unelected Justices who need not pander for money to be reelected,
it is more independent of the rich and powerful than either of the elected
branches. Consequently, the Court has an obligation to resist private abuses, a
responsibility it has not adequately fulfilled. Nevertheless, the Court has done
a better overall job than the two elected branches in making our society more
just, particularly by expanding some individual human rights vis A vis the
government. For example, the Supreme Court for many years led the battle
against segregation, a particularly nasty combination of public and private
malfeasances. This cluster of normative and descriptive claims, which I have
never seen before, provides the impetus for the rest of this Commentary's
discussion.
Chomsky's descriptive claim is easy to verify. Under our constitutional text,
Supreme Court Justices never face an election. Nor do they have to raise large
amounts of money to be appointed. More importantly, they do not have to
continually cultivate the support of the rich and powerful to keep their jobs.
They can only be removed through congressional impeachment for "High
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Thus, they have a singular capacity to resist
private power. Of course, the moneyed interests watch the federal judiciary
and its decisions very closely. The Justices are nominated by the President, who
must run for office, and then confirmed by the Senate, whose members also
face increasingly expensive electoral hurdles. While the average citizen may
think the most important legal issues are abortion or affirmative action, the
corporations want the Courts to protect and enhance their wealth and power.
For them, legal fields like labor law, administrative law, securities law, and
antitrust are far more important than such "social issues" as school prayer, "hate
speech," or abortion.
Chomsky's normative claims are far more controversial. Many people will
not conclude that private corporations have inordinate power. Nor will they
see private capital as a major threat to liberty. Indeed, they might respond that
private capital is and has been a major bulwark against tyranny. Furthermore,
they may disagree that the Courts have a general obligation to check the abuses
of private power. The Constitution grants "negative liberties" that only protect
us from certain governmental abuses; it provides few "positive liberties" that
can be asserted against either the government or private power.20 In addition,
Madison and his colleagues drafted the Constitution to protect private wealth
19 Chomsky believes that even when the government has provided or supported
formal individual rights, it also has created a system that derives those rights of
substance. He provides a metaphorical example: A person has a "right" to listen to a
harmonica next door, but that "right" does not really mean much when someone has
twenty-five boom boxes set up between you and your neighbor.
20Judge Richard Posner described the Constitution as a "charter of negative liberties;
it tells states to let people alone." Powers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
19961
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from "majority tyranny." Those who believe the Court should be bound by the
Framers' intent can argue that Chomsky's analysis ironically demonstrates that
the Court has appropriately fulfilled its mission. In addition, disputes about
the distribution of wealth are so "political" that they should be left to the
electoral branches, just like most foreign policy decisions.
Chomsky's terminology also needs to be considered. It may be desirable to
limit the concepts of "tyranny" and "totalitarianism" to governmental power,
which monopolizes authorized coercive force.2 1 Chomsky's normative test of
"legitimacy" should be further defined. Although his choice of words is
debatable, disputes over precise meanings and applications should not distract
from us describing, evaluating, and opposing the unjust actions and inactions
of the powerful.
As noted, some of Chomsky's opinions, particularly his anarchism, are so
unusual that they will not be persuasive in this legal/political culture, which
is largely grounded on authority and continuity. Furthermore, many of us are
wary of sweeping political abstractions and radical changes, despite our
profound dissatisfaction with large parts of our existing culture. Perhaps
unrealistically, we want many of the benefits of capitalism without so many of
its excesses. One way to validate Chomsky's less extreme positions is to
demonstrate their consistency with some of the most influential examples of
Western political thought. This Commentary will consider four authorities
who are hardly considered standard-bearers of the Left: Aristotle, Edmund
Burke, James Madison, and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Insights from Aristotle, Burke, Madison, Holmes, and Chomsky will be
combined into following set of propositions: (1) the Supreme Court has a
constitutional and historical obligation to resist tyranny and other forms of
constitutional perversion and factionalism; (2) the Supreme Court has a unique
duty and capacity to combat abuses of private power; (3) private corporations
and the well-to-do have gained so much power that they have become a
dangerous faction that is turning our government and society into a perverse
oligarchy, hostile to the common good of all; (4) the Supreme Court has acted
illegitimately by enhancing rather than resisting the strength of this faction.
I am not asserting that any of these five thinkers would agree with these four
propositions or their application to American society. Instead, I am utilizing
these men's thoughts to develop a framework for evaluating different aspects
of our constitutional culture, be it the Supreme Court or the escalating power
of the affluent. The intellectual historian J.G. A. Pocock once described two
modes of intellectual analysis. An intellectual historian like Pocock tries to
determine what a writer or speaker meant by his words. This Commentary,
however, falls into Pocock's second category:
21Although this Commentary spends some time criticizing Chomsky's term "private
tyranny," Chomsky observes that few people in our intellectual culture have such
conceptual qualms about using Madison's famous term, "majority tyranny." If the
majority can seize the government and pass tyrannical laws, why cannot certain
minorities, particularly the rich and powerful, engage in equally tyrannical actions?
[Vol. 44:439
HeinOnline  -- 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 444 1996
NOAM CHOMSKY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The non-historical practitioner is not concerned with what the author
of a statement made in a remote past meant by it so much as with what
he in his present can make it mean: what he can do with it for purposes
of his own, which may or may not-and therefore do not have
to-coincide with those of the author.
22
I. ARISTOTLE ON TYRANNY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PERVERSION
To analyze Chomsky's views and this article's propositions, we should try
to determine what kinds of human behavior constitute "totalitarianism,"
"tyranny," "illegitimacy," and so forth. Aristotle's work is always a good place
to start political analysis. Aristotle provided Western civilization with a variety
of tools for describing and evaluating a society's strengths and weaknesses, its
political vices and virtues. These descriptive and normative tools have
survived the tests of time and experience; they are at the core of our culture.
Furthermore, the Aristotelian perspective is more traditional, less threatening,
and more accessible than the Marxist tradition, the abode of many
contemporary progressives and Leftists. Most thoughtful people know that
Marx would despise our culture. It is relatively easy to use Marxist analysis to
explain many current problems. But too few people recognize how far our
country has deviated from many of Western society's basic norms. Many social
activists may recoil at this attempt to combine the best of progressive and
conservative thought. Under such an approach, change tends to be
incremental. Grand abstractions play less of a role. One has less confidence in
one's analysis, predictions, and proposals for improvement.
Aristotle believed that our species could only be "human" in a political
structure. 23 Humanity's political dilemma is to develop and protect the type of
constitution that will most likely provide a stable culture which also facilitates
individual pursuit of happiness through virtue and contemplation.24 For
Aristotle, the word "constitution"25 emphasized actual distributions of wealth
and power far more than formal, legal structures. There are three basic forms
of government: majority rule (democracy), the rule by an elite (aristocracy) and
a single ruler (monarchy). Each form's legitimacy or illegitimacy is determined
by the rulers' actions and motives: "For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which
has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest
of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all."26
22 J.G.A. POCOCK, LANGUAGES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
STUDY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, in PoLrrics, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 7 (1989).
23Aristotle, The Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1987 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984) ("man is by nature a political anaimal").
24 See generally id.
251d. at 2056.
26 1d. at 2030 (emphasis added).
1996l
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According to Aristotle, "constitutional democracy" is the preferred form of
government.2 7 Premised upon equality of citizenship, it is likely to be the most
enduring,28 the most just, and the most open to individual excellence and
growth. Constitutional democracies usually have a vibrant middle class, which
in the long run tends to be more reliable than either the upper or lower classes:
"Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate
and sufficient property."29 "Constitutional democracy" can degenerate into a
deviant form of government that Aristotle called "pure democracy." Under his
definition of "pure democracy," the middle class/poor majority no longer
protects the common good of everyone in the city; they maximize their personal
interests at the expense of the rich. Indeed, Aristotle believes undemocratic
systems can sometimes have more justice than particular democracies. A
monarchy or an aristocracy can legitimately rule a society so long as it pursues
the common good of all, not just its own interests. However, when a monarch
seeks to fulfill only his own gratification, he becomes a "tyrant." When an
aristocracy plunders the citizenry, they create an oligarchy.
Aristotle's basic normative standard of constitutional legitimacy, "the
common good of all," has strong egalitarian and universalistic intimations. He
does not limit his analysis to the "public interest" or the "common good," which
are our culture's preferred terms. The social order must serve "all."30 Thus,
Aristotle's primary test for legitimacy is outcome: Do the rulers usually fulfill
their private interests or do they enhance the common good of all? But he also
focused on process, concluding that constitutional democracy was the form of
government most likely to create the largest number of citizens capable of
achieving virtuous "happiness" and protecting "the common good of all."
Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as Chomsky's "corporate
tyranny" in Aristotle's system. "Tyranny" is reserved for the monarch who seeks
personal pleasure at the expense of everyone else. Yet Aristotle offered other
terms, "perversion" and "despotism," that apply to other modes of injustice that
are far more relevant to our inquiry. Any part of the constitution, be it the
majority, the aristocracy, or the monarchy, that successfully pursues its interests
at the expense of the "common good of all" becomes "perverse." Thus, the
extent, distribution, and nature of private power are fundamental
constitutional questions. At some point, the rich and powerful no longer act
"legitimately."31 They exploit the other classes, directly injuring those groups
27 d. at 2056-58.
28 Aristotle, The Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2033 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1989)
29 1d. at 2057.
30 This definition is still incomplete. Aristotle's constitution protects all "citizens." We
next need to determine who are "citizens." In his preferred constitution, Aristotle
excluded women, slaves, barbarians, and most of the "degraded" laboring classes.
31Chomsky observes that this definition of "legitimacy" is insufficient because it is
purely outcome-oriented. We need "legitimate" processes and outcomes. For example,
America could be ruled by a truly wise tyrant. He or she might even improve the
[Vol. 44:439
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and destabilizing the society in the process. This Aristotelian reinterpretation
of Chomsky does not prove that concentrated private power has perverted
America's constitution, but it does permit us to question the legitimacy of such
constitutional developments as the dramatic increase of the economic and
political power of the well-to-do during the past twenty years.
Aristotle's definitions must be modified to reflect major differences between
Greek cities and contemporary America. Aristotle limited his conception of
"democracy" to a relatively small group of somewhat poor, middle class, and
aristocratic "citizens" who could meet together. He excluded women, slaves, or
laborers. In the United States, the popular "majority" consists of a mixture of
the lower and middle classes, but the current electoral "majority" is dominated
by the rich and the upper middle class. If only fifty percent of the populace
votes, the political party most deferential to the rich and their allies need only
twenty-six per cent of the vote. For starters, it costs more and more money to
win election to powerful offices. Nor could Aristotle have envisioned a country
in which the majority has more wealth than almost any group in history.
However the terms are modified to reflect America's complex political and
economic order, the country's constitution should be judged by Aristotle's
ultimate standard: Does it serve "the common good of all?" In terms of foreign
policy, Chomsky and others have provided ample data to answer that question
negatively. Thousands of other sources, including Chomsky's article that
immediately precedes this Commentary, demonstrate continual oppression
within our homeland.32
Aristotle did not simply assert on moral grounds that constitutional
democracy was superior to aristocracy, monarchy, or tyranny He preferred
democracy because it tended to create the most stable, self-sufficient
governments. 33 Political stability was a precondition to achieving other human
goals, a necessary but insufficient aspect of "legitimacy." Aristotle did not see
stability as the only governmental responsibility; many savage tyrants
established dynasties that lasted for centuries. Thus, Aristotle's analysis is not
purely idealistic; it is also pragmatic and can be tested by historical experience.
In other words, history may provide some justification for constitutional
democracy. Recent history tends to support his conclusion. Albeit horribly
flawed, the English and American forms of democracy have outlasted many
forms of totalitarianism and dictatorship throughout the Twentieth Century.
On the other hand, many democracies have malfunctioned: the Weimar
Republic, Italy before Mussolini, France after the Revolution, and so forth.
common good of all." But he or she would still be wielding illegitimate authority.
3 2 See generally EDWARD L. AYERS, VENEGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984) (describing appalling treatment of freed
African-Americans through the "convict labor" system); HARRY CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES
TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1962) (describing corporate rapine of Appalachia over past two
centuries).
33 Aristotle, The Politics, supra note 23, at 2057.
1996]
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These casualties are grim reminders of democracy's perpetual vulnerability to
external threats and internal moral decline.
II. EDMUND BURKE ON HISTORY, LEGITIMACY, AND MIXED GOVERNMENT
It may initially appear bizarre to link Noam Chomsky to Edmund Burke, the
Eighteenth Century founder of modem conservatism. Nevertheless, Burke's
thinking provide additional means to integrate some of Chomsky's less radical
claims into an evaluation of our legal/political/economic culture. Both men
have been willing to battle what they perceive to be tyrannical. Chomsky's
foreign policy critique goes back decades.34 For ten years, Burke exhausted
himself attempting to impeach Warren Hastings, the governor-general of
Bengal.35 Parliament eventually censured Burke's relentless pursuit of
Hastings. 36
Burke believed that most existing institutions had, by their very endurance,
become legitimate. 37 He trusted the wisdom and experience of prior
generations that were imbedded in long-lasting institutions, concluding that
existing generations had a covenant with past and future generations to
maintain their pre-existing institutions.38 Conceptualization and reason, taken
to extremes, undermine a healthy deference to the status quo, which usually is
wiser than any particular person. Even people who run institutions often do
not know how they actually work. Burkean analysis can easily be used to
defend existing corporate power as a venerable use of power reflecting the
common sense of the American populace. But Burke was not completely
deferential to authority or the status quo; he supported the American
Revolution as a lawful effort to protect their liberties. 39 At some moment,
tyrannical actions strip an institution, even England's King in Parliament, of
its right to rule. Thus, Burke determined an institution's legitimacy by its
historical capacity to resist tyranny, not by purely abstract standards, such as
longevity.40
34 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, THE CHOMSKY READER (James Peck ed., 1987).
3 5 IssAC KRAMNICK, THE RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE: PORTRAIT OF AN AMBIVALENT
CONSERVATIVE 127 (1977).
36 Id.
37 Edmund Burke, Reform of Representation in the House of Commons, in 6 WORKS 146
(Bohn Edition, 1861) (1792). "Prescription is the most solid of titles, not only to property,
but, which is to secure that property, to government ... " Id.
3 8 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 22 (T. Mahoney ed.
1982) (1990) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS].
39 Edmund Burke, Speech On Conciliation With America, in BURKE'S SPEECHES 82
(Francis Selby ed., 1974) (1775).
40 In a prior article, I derived this principle from Burke's work. James G. Wilson,
Justice Diff used: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five
Conservative, Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 913, 919 (1986).
[Vol. 44:439
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Burke later virulently opposed the French Revolution, believing that it
unnecessarily and dangerously elevated political abstractions like equality and
liberty over decent existing institutions. He correctly predicted that the French
Revolutionaries' passion for conceptual purity would lead to violence. 41 Burke
thereby reminds us that one cannot only use abstractions to determine when
tyranny or perversion have emerged or triumphed. One must carefully assess
particular facts before labeling as 'justified" or "unjustified" such political
events as the American and French Revolutions.
42
Like Aristotle, Burke argued that every part of a constitution could become
corrupt or impotent. Indeed, there are certain predictable, recurring
constitutional arguments that one could always make against any part of
government or society. Kings tend to become despotic and self-absorbed,4 3 the
masses ignorant and grasping;4 4 and the aristocracy rapacious and decadent.
4 5
Consequently, abstract constitutional arguments cannot by themselves be
sufficiently persuasive; they must resonate within a particular culture as valid
explanations of a particular constitutional controversy. To paraphrase Burke,
we need not debate long about whether any part of a constitution is "eligible"
to be dangerous, we must determine if such danger is "imminent."4 6 To take
two relatively contemporary examples, there is little difference between
Senator McCarthy's and Senator Erwin's conceptions of "executive privilege."
Nevertheless, many people believe that McCarthy abused his Congressional
power of investigation in the 1950s when he went hunting for alleged
Communists in the Army, while Erwin appropriately asserted congressional
prerogatives to expose executive branch wrongdoing that permeated the
Nixon administration. Debates over the formal distributions of power often
reflects partisan views over which party controls which part of the constitution.
A few years ago, some Republicans railed against an "imperial Congress,"47 but
they stopped making such complaints after gaining control of Congress. One
doesn't hear many Democrats talking about an "imperial Presidency" while
President Clinton remains in office. Many people base their views of the Special
Prosecutor's Act upon which party is holding the presidency.
4 1 BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 38, at 42.
42 0n this point Burke commented, "[c]ircumstances (which some gentlemen pass for
nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and
discriminating effect." Id. at 8.
4 3 EDMUND BURKE, A VINDICATION OF NATURAL SocIErY 45 (1756).
44 Id. at 53-55.
451d. at 57-59.
46 Edmund Burke, Thoughts On The Present Discontents, in 2 THE WRrrlNGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE, 268 (Paul Langford, ed. 1981) (1770).
47 See GORDON S. JONES & JOHN A. MARINI, THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS: CRISIS IN THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (1988).
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By questioning the legitimacy of every branch of the English Constitution,
Burke extended the notion of "tyranny" beyond Aristotle's corrupt despots.
Aristotle had insufficiently differentiated class distinctions from the formal
structure of government. New standards were needed to evaluate particular
governmental structures. First, Burke believed that the best form of
government was "mixed government," which combines the powers and
interests of the Monarchy, the aristocracy, and the populace. The English
Constitution was praiseworthy because it blended all three parts of society into
the formal system called "The King in Parliament." For something to become
law, it had to meet the approval of the House of Commons, representing the
majority, the House of Lords, representing the aristocracy, and the King.
Second, Burke agreed with Montesquieu that there should be some
institutional division of these constitutional powers. The structure of society
ought to reproduce itself in the legal structure of government. One must study
not just the rival groups' actual powers but also the powers of the particular
governmental institutions that tended to represent them. The goal was to
maintain a healthy constitutional equilibrium between the three branches and
three economic groups: "Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with
steep precipies, and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it from a
dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risque of oversetting it on
the other. "48
Burke's views can be combined with Aristotle's analysis to generate a
standard to help evaluate Chomsky's less radical positions as well as the
decisions of the Supreme Court: Every component of society or government
gains its "legitimacy" not just through its current activities, but also through its
historical capacity to resist tyranny and constitutional perversion. Assuming
this interpretation of Burke is appropriate, Chomsky's arguments can be recast
as follows: The Supreme Court, which is uniquely immunized from private
power, has acted illegitimately by failing to resist private corporate tyranny
and by enhancing that power, which has grown steadily over the past two
centuries into a powerful faction that is driving the political/legal system
toward a perverse oligarchy. This reconceptualization blends Chomsky's
claims about the Supreme Court's unique powers and obligations with his
notion of "illegitimacy."
There are several advantages to focusing on a political institution's historical
capacity to resist tyranny and perversion. First, it is somewhat easier to develop
a consensus over the "bad" than the "good." For instance, almost all of us oppose
racism, but the continuing debate over affirmative action demonstrates that we
remain deeply divided over the appropriate role of race in the meaning of
"equality." Next, the Framers passed and a significant portion of the People
ratified the Constitution to protect themselves from "tyranny."49 At some point
48 Burke, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, in 2 THE WarrINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE, supra note 46, at 252.
49 There will always be disputes over how and when to apply the Aristotelian
standards, which operate a very high level of abstraction. After all, most of us consider
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argument expires: Opposition to tyranny is a premise that ultimately must be
accepted intuitively as "self evident."
III. MADISON ON MAJORITY TYRANNY, PROPERTY, FACTIONS, THE COMMON
GOOD, PATRIOTISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STUCTURE
Although aware of the notion of "mixed constitutions," Madison believed
that the American Constitution was fundamentally "democratic" in Aristotle's
best sense of the word. The Constitution created a constitutional democracy
that would protect the "common good." The Constitution had to be ratified by
the People through special Constitutional conventions. Directly or indirectly,
all major government officials, including federal judges, could trace their
employment back to the electorate. Nevertheless, Madison's Constitution
mimicked some of the virtues of Burke's mixed government by creating three
institutions that were in form monarchial, democratic, and aristocratic. The
Presidency, elected by a select group in the Electoral College, resembled
Monarchy. The tenured Court, insulated from direct political pressure, looked
like a hereditary aristocracy, with a particular charge to protect the Constitution
and private rights.50 The Senate combined aristocratic and democratic motifs;
the Senators were not directly elected by the people. Yet they had to run for
office every six years as a State Legislator and then persuade a majority in their
State Legislature that they ought to go to Washington. The House of
Representatives was the only direct representative of the majority.
This design was hardly coincidental. One need not be a Marxist to recognize
that one of James Madison's primary goals in drafting the American
Constitution was to protect the wealthy from "majority tyranny."51 For
Madison, unequal distribution of the wealth was an inevitable and desirable
result of inequality in talents: "The diversity in the faculties of men from which
the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
Government."52 He justified that goal in a letter to Jefferson that described
important aspects of the proposed Constitution: "A reform therefore which
many of Aristotle's views to be perverse, even tyrannical. He supported slavery,
perceived women to be inferior, and thought Greeks were inherently superior to other
races.
50 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 89 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals .... ).
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Although he foresaw other sources of political division, Madison thought "the unequal
distribution of property" was the "most common and durable source of factions." Id. at
79.
521d. at 78 (emphasis added).
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does not make provision for private rights, must be materially defective."53
Once again, we encounter the Aristotelian anxiety about class conflict, but now
largely concerned about the fate of the wealthy. Under the proposed
Constitutional system, Madison predicted that the greatest tyrannical threat
would come from the majority's representative, the Legislative Branch. This
prediction is very Aristotelian; Aristotle feared that "constitutional
democracies" would degenerate into perverse "democracies" in which the poor
pillaged the rich at the expense of the common good.
Madison's desire to protect the rich clearly clashes with Chomsky's ideology
and several of this article's propositions. If the most immediate purpose of the
Constitution is to protect the rich from majority threats, the Constitution and
the Court have fulfilled their functions quite well. The "aristocratic" part of the
formal Constitution, the judiciary, has done an exemplary job of supporting the
most powerful element in the American aristocracy, the rich. Under certain
interpretations of the Constitution, our whole inquiry is over: Using judicial
review to battle private injustices appears contrary to the Framers' intentions.
After all, the Framers put several clauses into the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights to protect private property rights.
Although there can be no doubt that Madison was particularly worried
about the fate of the well-to-do, there is also little doubt that he wanted the
Constitution to accomplish other ends, ends that can conflict with special
concern for the rich. Madison was a patriot; he wanted a Constitution that
would serve the entire country well over the long run.54 He frequently utilized
Aristotelian terms, such as "the common good."5 5 The Constitution's primary
goal was to benefit all Americans, not just the affluent (even though they were
the favored minority). He must have also known that threats could emerge
elsewhere. The American Revolution was a reaction to abuses by King George
III as well as by Parliament. 56 The Society of the Cincinnati, consisting of
ex-military officers, considered a coup d'etat to put George Washington into
complete power.57 Madison probably agreed with his colleague, Alexander
Hamilton, when Hamilton wrote in another Federalist Paper that the judicial
branch was "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution."5 8
53 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE
ON THE CONSTrTUTION 199 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1993).
54Id. at 193. "It appears to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to
cherish and preserve the Union of the States." Id.
55"[A]11 the deputations composing the Convention, were either satisfactorily
accommodated by the final act; or were induced to accede to it, by a deep conviction of
the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good." THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 231 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
56 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
5 7 See GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUs: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
138-48 (1984). Washington's greatest contribution to our country was refusing that offer.
58THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Observe that Hamilton said the judiciary was the least dangerous branch, not
that it or either of the other two branches were incapable of becoming
dangerous. Thus, these two men, like Burke, were aware that constitutional
instability and injustice could emerge from a variety of sources.
It is possible that Madison would continue to believe that the rich could
never constitute a faction that could become so "dangerous" under our
electoral, republican form of government that they could undermine our
constitutional order, economically, politically, and legally. It is a fool's game to
state how someone two hundred years ago would analyze and decide a
particular problem today. If I were miraculously reconstituted two hundred
years from now, I would first want to learn what had happened before I
expressed any political opinions. I would not want to apply my existing
analysis in a vacuum. Subsequent human experience probably would convince
me that many aspects of my political/moral philosophy were wrong, flawed,
irrelevant, while other views remained valid.
Furthermore, Madison opposed excessive inequality of wealth. He split with
Alexander Hamilton when Hamilton, acting as Secretary of the Treasury, paid
all the unpaid debts for the Revolutionary War to the existing holders of debt
instruments. Unless they had kept the paper, the soldiers who fought the war
for next to nothing received no further compensation. 59 Thus, Madison
included at least some notion of "public values" within his conception of
"private rights." Nor was Madison alone. During the ratification debate over
the Constitution, Noah Webster wrote: "The liberty of the press, trial by jury,
the Habeas Corpus writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the
palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations, when compared with a
general distribution of real property among every class of people."60
Madison surely knew that tyranny comes in many forms. Dismayed by
Shay's Rebellion and pro-debtor State legislation, he decided that the majority's
capacity to exploit the rich was the most probable danger.61 Yet majority
tyranny could not be the only possible internal threat to our Constitutional
community. Some non-majoritarian factions could subvert or overcome the
republican principle of majority rule.62 Madison was particularly concerned
about religious factions. I suspect he believed that the evolutionary nature of
the Constitution, both in terms of political practices and the common-law
nature of judicial decision-making, should combat tyranny, factionalism, and
5 9 IRviNG BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 119, 174-75 (1950).
60 Noah Webster, A Citizen of America, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONsTrrUTION, supra
note 53, at 158. Aristotle expressed similar sentiments: "Great then is the good fortune
of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some
possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy or pure
oligarchy .... Aristotle, Politics, supra note 23, at 2057.
61 Madison, Letter, supra note 53, at 204. 'The paper money faction in Rh. Island is
hostile." Id.
62 THE FEDERAuST No. 1, at 407 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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perversion, whatever their particular manifestation. It would be odd for him
to cling to all his predictions and fears, knowing some of them could not come
true. For instance, he predicted that the Legislature would consist of the finest
men in the land, i.e., aristocratic gentlemen like himself. That prediction quickly
proved inaccurate, much to the despair of many members of his class.63 If he
had known that the government would be run by less refined men, would he
have changed his other views on any aspects of the formal Constitution?64
Even if Madison still would believe that the Constitution can be vulnerable
to only one form of tyranny, majority tyranny, there is no reason for us to be
bound by such a naive vision. It is better to take Burke's and Aristotle's views,
being perpetually alert to the possibility of oppression coming from any
direction. Only the foolish remain wedded to their initial experiences of
tyranny, turning them into the exclusive sources of future injustice. History and
the Framers' views are important factors in constitutional adjudication but
should never be exclusive factors.
IV. EviL's PROTEAN NATURE
To apply this article's four propositions, we need more precise definitions of
totalitarianism, tyranny, perversion, and factionalism. Aristotle limited the
term "tyranny" to self-seeking monarchs. Burke concluded that problems could
arise within any governmental branch or class, as well as from the government
as a whole. Echoing Montesquieu, Madison emphasized the tyrannical danger
coming from one faction/person's effective control of all governmental powers
or from the "majority." Such structural analysis meant that enlightened
monarchies, Aristotle's ideal form of government, were tyrannies because true
monarchs had all governmental powers under their control. But Madison
additionally worried about the majority's using the government to confiscate
wealth from the rich; his structural analysis quickly commingled with class
consciousness. Chomsky has reapplied these notions to the modem corporate
system, labeling corporations as "private tyrannies" and "corporate
totalitarianism" to dramatize how our conventional techniques of political
analysis tend to focus on "governmental tyranny" and "majority tyranny," not
nefarious "private tyranny."
Words like "totalitarian," "tyrannical," "perverse," and "factional" can be
applied to many forms of evil and oppression. Applications of these terms may
overlap so much that the more potent terms lose some of their significance. In
many ways, all these terms are "conclusions of politics" that resemble technical
"conclusions of law," such as "negligence" or "fraud." One can never know
whether a particular injury was caused by "negligence" without closely
63 1d. at 409.
64 Chomsky notes that a semi-democracy run by "refined men," even if they were
decently motivated, would still be illegitimate. It is not enough to have either the right
form of constitution or the right outcomes. One must have both to have true
constitutional "legitimacy."
[Vol. 44:439
HeinOnline  -- 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 454 1996
NOAM CHOMSKY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
studying the particular facts. The same process applies to determining when a
society or part of that society has become "tyrannical" or "totalitarian."
Furthermore, political and legal terms include prevailing community
standards. Rivals in any heated political debate have used and are likely in the
future to employ this type of conclusory political terminology. During the
slavery debate, abolitionists claimed slavery was tyrannical, while Southerners
replied that confiscating that form of property was the real tyranny. In our era,
Right to Lifers could easily characterize abortion as private tyranny: The
mother murders the fetus. Pro-Choicers could reply that the government
would tyrannically seize their bodies should it outlaw abortion. At times, the
concept of tyranny comes close to being the flip side of "natural law" and/or
"natural rights," profoundly ambiguous terms.
Of course, no modem politician will say he or she is primarily interested in
his or her own glory and wealth. The politician will dress up actions, no matter
how vile, in the rhetoric of virtue. Consequently, we always must plunge
beneath the prevailing rhetoric to make case-by-case determinations of the
nature and extent of evil within a particular society or parts of it, relying on
norms within that society as well as more enduring, "universal" norms, such
as those provided by Aristotle. I doubt that we all can or should agree on a
precise definition of "tyranny," any more than we will concur on a particular
definition of "fraud." Nor will we concur on our applications of any
agreed-upon definition to particular facts. After all, legal terms like
"negligence" and "fraud" are left significantly indeterminate so they can be
applicable to novel situations warranting legal punishment. We shouldn't want
our political pejoratives to be any less responsive to new manifestations of
injustice. Humanity's capacity to invent new modes of evil is far too well
known.
One solution is to apply the terms "tyranny" and "totalitarianism" only to
governments, which directly control most uses of coercive force. Under such a
definition, there can be no such thing as Chomsky's "private totalitarianism"
or "private tyranny." I tend to believe the most damning pejorative,
"totalitarianism" should rarely be used and should only be applied to
governments. Totalitarian regimes are governments which are immune from
elections, use a sweeping ideology to dominate virtually every aspect of a
society, and often slaughter large numbers of people in the process.65 Hitler's
Germany, Pol Pot's Cambodia, and Stalin's Soviet Union are classic examples.
We need a special category for the purest forms of evil that our species has so
far invented. However, virtually every major power in World History has
engaged in what Chomsky calls "mass murder." Witness the Japanese in China
earlier this Century, the late Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the United States
in Southeast Asia and Central America. 66
65 See, e.g., HANNA ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1973).
66 Amnesty International published some leaked government documents
demonstrating that the United States government has been knowingly supplying arms
to "every Columbian military unit that Amnesty has implicated in murdering civilians
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 455 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
As is the case with legal reasoning, such political categories should not be
built solely through abstractions but should rely on examples that provide
grounds for subsequent analogies. The average Aristotelian tyrant is not as
ambitious as the totalitarian tyrant. Aristotle's tyrant doesn't seek to regulate
all thoughts and actions, but merely wants all political power and the wealth
and pleasure that come with such power.
One can limit tyranny, like totalitarianism, to public governmental action,
but history suggests otherwise. The courts and the Constitution facilitated for
decades a pernicious form of private tyranny: slavery. As a Southern state court
judge explained in State v. Mann,67 slave-owners need to be able to shoot
recalcitrant slaves (even in the back) to make the system work: "The power of
the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect."68
Backed by state and private power, slave-owners could do almost whatever
they wanted to their victims. From the slave's perspective, a slave-owner
resembles a dictator. In short, state-endorsed and enforced slavery is a form of
"private tyranny."
Chomsky's phrase "private tyranny" thus has enduring analytic value. The
more difficult question is determining its scope. Chomsky appears to use the
phrase "private tyranny" in three ways. First, he is describing the internal
structure of large, private corporations. Next, "private tyranny" includes
corporate practices, particularly in the Third World. Third, he is referring to the
corporations' effective control of our government's domestic and foreign
policy.
Perhaps "private tyranny" should be limited to institutions and individuals
who engage in activities resembling slavery. With the fairly minor exception of
security guards, private power in America does not have direct power over the
use of governmental force (although its influence is pervasive). The private
sector cannot use violence to keep Americans on the job (although it can injure
them deeply by firing them).69 Furthermore, the written Constitution's basic
structure still provides significant protection against private power's gaining
complete control of the system, particularly through the Thirteenth
Amendment's general prohibition against slavery. But such a definition
generates the argument that the Thirteenth Amendment has made "private
tyranny" impossible. Perhaps we need to develop some new terminology, with
relatively definable limits, to describe the species' continual ability to create
novel forms of oppression, just as Hanna Arendt did with "totalitarianism."
two years ago." The Columbia Papers: Amnesty Obtains Documents on Misuse of U.S. Arms,
AMNESTY ACrION, Winter, 1997 at 1, 8. Thus, the "war on drugs" has often been'a war
on political dissent and the peasantry.
6713 N.C. 263 (1829).
681d. at 266.
69 Chomsky replies that the slave-owners had no more direct power over
governmental force than corporations do today, thus, the term "private tyranny" is
equally applicable.
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On the other hand, Chomsky's critique should remind us that most modem
corporations are incredibly centralized. Corporate leaders assert politically
unaccountable legislative, executive, and judicial functions within their realm.
Although they cannot use much force, bosses have powerful weapons: hiring,
firing, promoting, demoting, ignoring. Every corporate culture dictates to
varying degrees how one should dress, talk, and act-characteristics of tyranny
and totalitarianism. Every corporation can redefine any employee's purpose
and life at any moment. Furthermore, these corporations make many political
decisions-such as locating factories, determining the amount of pollution,
and donating huge amounts of money to politicians' campaigns-yet they are
not at all accountable to the People.
Aristotle, Burke, and Madison believed that the role of private wealth and
power, presently expressed primarily through corporate control, should be
part of constitutional analysis. It is always appropriate to assert, as a matter of
theory and practice, that internal and international wealth can undermine or
even destroy a society A faction need not have complete control before doing
irreparable damage. I believe that contemporary private corporate power can
best be described as a dangerous Madisonian faction that is attempting to turn
our country into the perversion that Aristotle called oligarchy. This faction has
not yet become so powerful that it has distorted every aspect of our constitution
into a permanent oligarchy, much less a "tyranny" or a "totalitarian society."
However, I agree with Chomsky that the wealthy and their corporate fictions
are presently the "most dangerous branch" of our constitution. They have
excessive power within the formal government and throughout society.70
For decades, Chomsky has demonstrated how American foreign policy has
reflected corporate interests. For example, he has shown the extension of the
"free market" actually means the invasion of governmentally supported private
power into other countries.71 The developing world must comply with free
market principles,72 while modern industrial corporations rely on state
subsidies and military support. Similar problems arise domestically. Now that
7 0For Aristotle, the wealthy's degree of power and use of power were basic
constitutional questions. Because America's political economy is so different than
Aristotle's Athens, it is harder to separate the powerful from the less powerful, to define
the "ruling class" with precision. Large, privately held corporations exclusively benefit
their wealthy owners. But the middle class and the upper middle class also own large
percentages of most publicly held corporations. However, such public corporations are
run by powerful individuals who feel constrained primarily by market norms.
Furthermore, these powerful entities need support from politicians, inventors, and
private lawyers. Consequently, I would argue that the United States' Aristotelian
aristocracy basically consists of the very wealthy, those who run the major corporations,
and their most important servants, a large group of politicians and professionals.
7 1 NoAM CHOMSKY, CHRONICLES OF DISSENT: INTERVIEWS WITH DAVID BARsAMIAN 166
(1992) [hereinafter CHOMSKY, CHRONICLES OF DISSENT].
72 Id. at 191.
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it costs hundreds of millions of dollars to run a Presidential campaign,73 where
is a candidate going to get that kind of money? Either directly from the wealthy
or their surrogates, private corporations. In 1989, before the recent stock market
boom, the wealthiest one percent owned forty percent of our country's wealth.
One needed at least $2.3 million to qualify as a member of that group.74 The
top twenty per cent received 55% of all after-tax income and controlled 80% of
the wealth.7 5 Using Aristotle's model, the wealthy and their supporters rely on
their own power and the power of private corporations to enhance their own
interests, not the "common good of all." Indeed, the primary legal duty imposed
on private corporations is to increase shareholder value. Particular
corporations and bosses come and go, but the 'rich are getting richer,
particularly in the past twenty years.
Private power's effective control of the government does not yet come close
to effective, continuing control. Legally and formally, America maintains the
structure of a republic. The populace can still vote and organize. Chomsky can
write his scathing critiques. Nor will all the middle class be completely
exploited in the foreseeable future. The wealthy and their corporations need
many talented individuals to keep the system running. Certain segments of the
voting population, particularly the aged and the upper middle class, receive
decent provisions. Many Americans have supported these constitutional
changes simply because they have prospered from them.
Widespread support for the status quo, particularly among the active
electorate, suggests that the internal system is not so oppressive as to be
characterized as narrowly "oligarchic." Aristotle never envisioned a society
where so many people would be so well off financially, where a very large
segment is "rich." From the perspective of the average human living under the
global market, the average middle class American resembles an aristocrat,
consuming far more than his or her share of the world's goods. In terms of the
world's constitution, America has become something close to an oligarchy, not
very interested in the common good of all. Like too many aristocrats before
them, many Americans are excessively self-seeking and pleasure-seeking. They
only ask what the country can do for them. In other words, millions of
Americans remain satisfied with the system even though (perhaps even
because) it exploits so many people within America and millions more
throughout the world.76
731ra Cinoy, In Quest for Presidency, Candidates Learned They Could Count on Finance
Laws, WASH. POsT, Nov. 5, 1996, at A17.
74 Keith Bradsher, Income Disparity Grows, Studies say: 1% of rich own about 40% of
Wealth, HOUSTON CHRONICLE April 17, 1995, at A2.
75 Id.
76Chomsky notes that Americans may be doing relatively well economically, but
they still are being exploited by the powerful. In other words, the average American
would be much better off, economically and psychologically, if the rich did not dominate
the political order.
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If this analysis is valid, Chomsky's diagnosis that our culture is evolving into
primarily being a "private corporate tyranny" is not so farfetched. Aristotle
equated the tyranny of one with aristocratic oligarchy and "democracy"; all
three are "perverse" forms which ignore the common good of all. Madison
worried about one economic faction, the majority. But Madison's underlying
anxieties about factional and class conflict might take a different direction in a
different era.
If a relatively pure American oligarchy is ever realized, the story could get
much worse. The powerful interests may conclude that most of the middle class
is as expendable as the working class (much less the poor). Already, it is much
harder for well-trained college students to get decent jobs with basic benefits.
Corporations hire highly trained workers abroad at a fraction of the cost.
Oligarchy is often a precursor to Aristotle's worst form of government, tyranny.
Some demagogue will promise to attack the "special interests" on behalf of the
People, demanding the sacrifice of many freedoms to combat corruption. Such
rhetoric already abounds within the contemporary political debate. Imagine its
effective utilization by a villain.
Even if the "corporate faction" never gains formal control of the entire
system, their beliefs and powers may so influence and permeate the
government and culture that they undermine our society. Every advertisement
contains a corrosive political message: You are redeemed and defined by what
you purchase. There is no need to wait until this faction has prevailed.
Everyone has a right to oppose forces and factions that are pushing their society
towards decline and perversion. The American Revolutionaries did not wait
until England acted hideously England's relatively mild revenue stamps
triggered wide-spread dissent that eventually led to revolution.77
While Chomsky sees the ruling class as the source of most contemporary
problems, my views are somewhat more pessimistic. Chomsky believes that
the corporations have manipulated public opinion so much that the public does
not know its own interests and cannot have its way. I think many members of
the middle and working classes knowingly support the status quo. Many
average Americans know most of their politicians are hypocrites. How else
could they re-elect President Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich? For
instance, many Americans understood that the war with Iraq was about
petroleum, not "naked aggression," nuclear proliferation, or even saving the
slaveowners who ran Kuwait. The average voter would get few of the profits
but would be able to purchase cheaper gasoline from a more "stable" source
than Saddam Hussein. Although our official culture is compulsively
sentimental and optimistic, many Americans know they are extremely well off,
perhaps more affluent than they deserve.
Americans are no more immune than anyone else from the basic tragedies
of life: children dying, disease, family conflict, and fear of the future. But at
least in public discourse, they prefer to present a more enthusiastic image. Nor
77 See Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century
America, 27 WILL. & MARY Q. 3 (1970).
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is that hopeful energy all bad; it helped build and solidify this country. One of
the greatest risks of corporate ascendancy is that corporate power will strip the
average American family of any realistic expectation of improvement by
moving and threatening to move so many jobs abroad.
At this point, one might conclude that all these hedges and distinctions
reduce the foregoing analysis to mush. How important is it to define different
forms of venality? Does it really matter if we call corporations "tyrannies" or
only "factions" that are perverting our Constitution? The debate over political
categories is important, but not the central issue. For instance, Chomsky stated
in an interview that the term "genocide" should be limited to those situations.
in which one group seeks to eliminate an entire population because of different
racial or ethnic status. Every other form of governmental massacres is a "mass
killing."78 Chomsky applied these definitions to conclude that Hitler's
atrocities were genocidal, while the recent Indonesian invasion of East Timor,
an act of aggression supported by the Clinton administration, was a "mass
killing."79 But Chomsky acknowledged that many decent people apply the
term "genocide" to what he considers to be "mass killings." The main thing is
to oppose all the venal actions that properly fall under the rubric of genocide
and mass murder, not to obsess over definitions and terminology. My
preference is to keep "genocide" and "totalitarianism" as separate as possible
from "mass murder," "tyranny," "illegitimacy," "faction," and "perversion." It
seems better to describe the existing political conflicts in America as struggles
between factions. But overall, I would much rather have somebody disagree
with my terminological models than conclude that Nazi politics, however
characterized, are admirable.
V. AssEssING THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
How does this cluster of definitions, observations, and norms influence our
evaluation of the Supreme Court's performance? Aristotle's least controversial
political goal is to create a society free from civil war and capable of resisting
invasion. This Hobbesian standard is easier to verify than many other
normative criteria. In many ways, the Anglo-American societies have
flourished compared to their neighbors. Over the last three hundred years,
England has not suffered from invasion or civil war. Since the Revolutionary
War, America has survived one civil war and one brief, unsuccessful invasion
in 1812. Their constitutions have outlasted all others. It is likely that this
78 CHOMSKY, CLASS WARFARE, supra note 7, at 159.
79 Id. Chomsky has not always applied this distinction in the same way; he earlier
described the Indonesian slaughter as "genocide." CHOMSKY, CHRONICLES OF DISSENT,
supra note 71, 16-18. Such "contradictions" do not "refute" Chomsky. Quite the contrary.
Categories, be they political, legal, or scientific, are tools to achieve greater ends: "We
begin any inquiry with puzzles about unexplained phenomena, which we try to sort
out into categories that which seem to fall together, caring little about boundaries, and
not expecting the categories to survive inquiry." CHOMSKY, POWERS & PROsPEcrs, supra
note 4, at 32.
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stability is in part attributable to having an electoral system and a tradition of
judicial participation via the common law method of adjudication. Without
their particular legal structures, it is more likely that these two countries'
histories would have been worse. One virtue of the legal process is its
continuing requirement that judges openly provide culturally acceptable
reasons for outcomes. It is hard for our courts to repudiate such widely held
norms as equality, individuality, or liberty. Once those humane concepts have
been introduced into a legal system, they can develop internal momentum and
external support. As E.P. Thompson explained in his classic book, Whigs and
Hunters:
The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more
than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways,
the behavior of the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may
disguise the true realities of power, but, at the same time, they may
curb that power and check its intrusions. And it is often from within
that very rhetoric that a radical critique of the practice of society is
developed.... 80
Stability was not Aristotle's exclusive political norm. Cruel despots can
create systems that last for centuries. Aristotle only approved of stable societies
that also provide for individual happiness and the common good of all. In some
ways, America and England have had admirable records. Since 1688, neither
the English nor American governments has plunged into tyranny by
permanently eliminating elections or concentrating all power permanently in
the hands of a single person or group. No branch of government has remained
completely immune from public opinion or judicial review.8 1 Both societies
have created and enforced many new and important individual rights,
enabling individuals to pursue more easily their "happiness." The two societies
have often compromised fundamental rights during wartime but have
returned to better practices after particular threats have subsided. Indeed,
important First Amendment rights expanded during the Viet Nam War.82
Chomsky believes that America is the freest country on earth in terms of
citizens' legal rights.
This Commentary will not going to provide much empirical data to support
its normative claim that private corporate power has become a dangerous,
destabilizing faction, approaching but not yet reaching the status of a perverse
oligarchy. In other words, America presently has the formal structure of a
mixed government, grounded on popular sovereignty, but its functional
distribution of power approaches that of an oligarchy fueled by imperial
8 0 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK AcT 265 (1975).
81 See James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037.
82New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (invalidating lower court
injunction against publication of Pentagon Papers) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (permitting person to wear coat with the slogan "Fuck the Draft").
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ambitions. Arguments and evidence for both sides can be found in abundance
elsewhere. For savage criticism, one can turn to works like the article written
by Chomsky that precedes this Commentary or almost anything written in The
Progressive. The editorial page of the Wall Street Journal and magazines like
Forbes83 relentlessly defend corporate power. Their main lament is that the rich
and the corporations do not have enough wealth and power. They want capital
gains taxes eliminated and Social Security taxes for the working and middle
classes increased. As Steve Forbes intimated by running for President, the best
"capitalist tool" is the U.S. government.
Perhaps there are no serious problems in buying toys made by many millions
of child laborers and slaves; reallocating more and more wealth to the top one
percent of the population; having Presidential elections that cost at least eight
hundred million dollars; reducing assistance to impoverished children;84
seeing the defense and intelligence agencies' budgets expand at the expense of
national security 85 even though the Cold War is long over; and watching many
of our country's children turn into barbarians in the shadow of subsidized
sports arenas. But for those of us who have become increasingly disenchanted
with the overall direction of our country, this Chomsky-inspired mode of
analysis may be particularly helpful.
As with other conclusory normative categories that are part of any system
of law and politics, we will disagree about particular facts and the normative
implications of those facts even if we accept the basic Aristotelian standard that
the constitution should serve the "common good of all." This Commentary's
analytical structure has been presented at a sufficiently high level of abstraction
that it will be helpful to those who disagree with my particular applications
and conclusions. To put the matter bluntly, someone could easily reapply this
approach on behalf of corporate America. Here are a few of the many
arguments that corporate advocates might make. Workers are free to leave any
corporation and work elsewhere; shareholders can sell their interests and
invest in other companies; market competition precludes economic
domination. The elected government can, and does, regulate and modify
corporations. Most Americans prefer the existing mix of public and private
power. The Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery prevents widespread
private tyranny, at least within the United States. Private power has been as
responsible as the legal system for America's freedom and stability. If we were
to rerun American history without private and corporate power, we might end
up with destitution similar to that existing in the now-collapsed Soviet Union.
83Sometimes these magazines ascribe as much power to private power as Noam
Chomsky does. For example, a recent Forbes cover claimed "Cyber Power gives financial
markets a veto over the President and Congress." FORBES, Dec. 2, 1996.
84Twenty-five per cent of all American children under the age of six live in poverty.
Melinda Beck, Next Population Bulge Shows Its Might, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at B1.
8 5See, e.g., DAvID HACKWORTH, Hazardous Duty (1996).
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUING ENHANCEMENT OF PRIVATE POWER
DEMONSTRATES ITS FAILURE TO FULFILL ITS CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT TO
COMBAT THIS FORM OF PERVERSION AND FACTIONALISM
A. Justice Holmes on Judicial Restraint in Constitutional Interpretation
The Supreme Court has always been aware of the political/economic
implications of its decisions. For two centuries, the Supreme Court usually has
interpreted the Constitution to protect private wealth and private property
rights. In the nineteenth century, it invented doctrines like "vested rights" 86 and
"substantive due process."87 It protected slavery before the Civil War and
facilitated private and public segregation despite the passage of the Civil War
Amendments. On the other hand, the Warren Court was less deferential to
corporate power. But in the last two decades, the Court has interpreted the First
Amendment to limit elected governments' power to regulate advertising and
campaign spending. Although there is little reason to expect any change for the
better in the foreseeable future, the Court should try to construe statutes to limit
the power of wealth. It also should, at the least, leave most legal constitutional
disputes over the structure of the economic constitution to the body politic.
There are many reasons why even a progressive Supreme Court should not
aggressively use constitutional law to resolve Aristotle's constitutional issue of
wealth distribution. In his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes
chastised the majority for constitutionalizing their particular economic
ideology of Social Darwinism.88 The Lochner Court had interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to preclude States from limiting
the number of hours that bakers could work. The majority concluded such laws
violate a constitutionally protected "right to contract." The Court thereby
elevated laissez-faire economics above such rivals as the Progressive
Movement and socialism. Justice Holmes believed the Supreme Court should
leave the basic structure of the economic system to the elected branches, which
can be more flexible and responsive to shifts in public opinion about proper
economic relationships. In other words, elections resemble nonviolent civil
wars; the victors could and would use the law to gain enormous power over
their rivals. The courts could regulate skirmishes and prevent individual acts
of violence, but they could and should do relatively little to resolve basic class
conflicts.
Furthermore, courts do not have the competence to regulate national
economies. They are isolated from rapid shifts in any economic and political
system. Their tool, constitutional doctrine, is a blunt instrument that cannot
make the nuanced, flexible decisions that invariably are part of generating and
86 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803) ("[A federal officer] cannot at his
discretion sport away with the vested rights of others.").
87 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (prohibiting States from regulating
the number of hours bakers could work).
881d. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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distributing wealth. In his Lochner dissent, Justice Holmes observed that the
Supreme Court had previously upheld other allegedly "tyrannical" regulations
of the market and individual liberties, such as governmental limitations on the
right to buy a lottery ticket.89 In a later decision, he noted that the legislature
can pass laws that will drive businesses to the point of ruin.90 After all, there is
no constitutional right to sell cocaine.
Courts must make legalistic distinctions over time that will neither be
internally coherent nor economically effective. For example, the Lochner
majority did not overrule a previous case which had held that States could
regulate miners' hours.91 According to the Lochner Court, mining was so much
more dangerous than baking that it could make a constitutional distinction
between the two occupations. Aside from the fact that baking was very
arduous, life-threatening work during this era,92 it seems absurd that
unelected, elderly judges should convert into constitutional stone their
hunches about the riskiness of other professions. Constitutional doctrine is
relatively inflexible and hard to change. The Court either has to reverse its
views or the Constitution has to be amended, a slow and difficult process
requiring supermajoritarian support.
Justice Holmes' arguments continue to have weight. In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council93 then-Justice Rehnquist
complained that the Supreme Court was getting too involved in protecting a
particular economic system, Adam Smith's laissez-faire economics, when it
provided commercial speech First Amendment rights under the
Constitution.94 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun blithely conceded
that his interpretation protects capitalism: "So long as we preserve a
predominately free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions."95 In a
subsequent case extending these new rights even further, Justice Rehnquist
analogized the Court's protection of capitalist advertising to the Lochner
Court's doctrine of "substantive due process."96 He believed the legislative
89 1d.
90 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915). "General Statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or
property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin."
9 1Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 336 (1898).
92 1n his Lochner dissent, Justice Harlan referred to a study demonstrating that few
bakers live more than fifty years 198 U.S. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93425 U.S. 748 (1976).
941d. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
951d. at 765.
96 Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of New York, 447
U.S. 577, 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1980). Many modem legal "conservatives"
quickly label the abortion rights cases as "illegitimate" but do not seem to apply the same
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branch should be primarily responsible for determining the appropriate
amount of advertising.
Theoretical political abstractions don't mean much if they do not suggest
possible resolutions of particular problems. There is a gap between universal
and particulars, but both are necessary to make reasoned decisions. The
following two sections shall briefly consider the Supreme Court's actions in
two important areas of federal law, anti-trust and campaign financing. The
following solutions, which are not original, are only offered as examples.
Significant reform in anti-trust law and campaign financing are necessary, but
woefully insufficient remedies to combat the excessive concentration of private
power presently plaguing America.
B. The First Amendment And Campaign Financing
As Justice Blackmun's quote in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy indicates, the
modem Court has often ignored Justice Holmes' warnings about using
constitutional doctrine to resolve basic questions of wealth and power. It is no
coincidence that both the major political parties have become ever more
solicitous of corporations and wealthy donors after the Supreme Court
protected the rich in Buckley v. Valeo9 7 by holding that Congress could not limit
the amount of money people spent "independently" on behalf of particular
candidates. This huge loophole allowed Political Action Committees (P.A.C.s)
and wealthy supporters to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the
campaign process. The end result is a television spectacular of thirty-second,
negative advertisements which leave large segments of the population
indifferent or nauseated. Whether intended or not, the overall message of these
ads is that all politicians and thus all governments are despicable.
Consequently, one should not rely on the government for assistance. One can
only trust the "invisible hand of the market."
The Buckley Court also gave rich individuals a perpetual advantage in
elections by allowing them to spend as much of their own money on elections
while not permitting less wealthy rivals to obtain similar amounts of money
from a single source.98 In other words, the rich have the inside track to win
elections. These days, the best qualification an entry level candidate can have
is personal wealth. One sees very few rich people willing to work their way up
the system, thereby having some contact with local governments, small
businesses, and the average person. Most affluent politicians prefer to start at
the top, running for major state or federal office. Many of these wealthy people
did little to deserve this political and economic power except to inherit their
fortune. Although Presidents like Madison, Jefferson, and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt demonstrate that aristocrats can be better-than-average Presidents,
analysis to the Court's constitutional protection of corporations, commercial
advertising, and the power of money in political campaigns.
97424 U.S. 1 (1975).
98 1d.at 51-54.
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we do not want to let the modem wealthy aristocracy, which in the aggregate
has an ever-diminishing sense of noblesse oblige, maintain their overwhelming
constitutional advantage.
In 1996, the Supreme Court gave the well-to-do even more power within the
political/legal system in Colorado Republican Finance Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission.99 By a seven-to-two vote, the Court held that
Congress could not limit the amount of "independent expenditures" that any
party could make "in connection with" a "general election campaign."
According to the Court, this practice is permissible so long as it is not
"coordinated." Consequently wealthy people and P.A.C.s can donate as much
money as they want to a particular party, thereby gaining influence and
"access," allegedly without corrupting the process or even appearing to corrupt
politics. Apparently the going rate for "access" to both parties' leadership is to
provide at least $250,000.100 Although particular candidates (with the notable
exception of the Presidential nominee who heads the party) cannot redirect that
party money to themselves, it is easy to imagine that somehow they could find
out how much of their supporters' money was later siphoned back.
Furthermore, if they want to get more money from the party in the future, they
better not offend the party or its richest donors.
The whole notion of "independent expenditures" is largely a fiction. To take
an infamous example, the "independent" group that sponsored the Willie
Horton ad in the 1988 Presidential campaign had worked very closely with Lee
Atwater, George Bush's most important political advisor, in designing and
presenting that advertisement. 10 1 Most of the money donated to the two parties
in 1996 somehow ended up in the Presidential campaign. Perhaps it is because
the Presidential candidate has effective control of the flow of party funds. The
corrosion runs in ever more troubling directions. The parties have received a
great deal of money from abroad.
Writing for a plurality of three in the Colorado case, Justice Breyer claimed
that the government had not proven that these independent campaign efforts
created any "corruption." Justice Breyer narrowly defined "corruption" as
something akin to bribery: "exchanges of large financial contributions for
political favors."102 Justice Breyer did not even discuss the possibility that there
99116 S. Ct. 2309.
100Wealthy Democratic donors who give or raise $250,000 get to have dinner with
President Clinton. Julia Malone, $250,000 gets you into Clinton Dinner, THE AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STANDARD, June 11, 1997, at Al. Those who agree to raise $250,000 for the
Republicans can have lunch with the Republican leadership, pose for photos, and attend
private receptions. Marc Lacey, Outcry Doesn't Halt GOP's $11.3 Million Fund-Raiser, L.A.
TIMES, May 14, 1997, at A4.
10 1Atwater said about Michael Dukakis, the Democratic Presidential nominee who
lost to Bush in 1988: "[I] would strip the bark off the little bastard [and] make Willie
Horton his running mate." quoted in John Brady, I'm Still Lee Atwater, WASHINGTON POST
SUNDAY, Dec. 1, 1996, at W16.
102116 S. Ct. at 2315.
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might be an "appearance of corruption" or the ample evidence that many
people across the political spectrum have concluded that the American political
process was becoming hopelessly corroded by money. Several leading
politicians recently resigned, in part because they had to spend so much of their
time fundraising. Justice Breyer also failed to mention that Congress has
tightened the budget of the Federal Election Commission to prevent that
agency from ferreting out wide-spread violations of campaign laws.
10 3
Criminal bribery is notoriously hard to prove. Nor is bribery a crime that
ambitious United States Attorneys are likely to bring against powerful
politicians unless the proof is overwhelming. Thus Justice Breyer buried his
preference for private power in such lawyer's tools as 'burdens of proof." He
knew the government could not possibly prove the wide-spread existence of
criminal bribery. Notice how easy it is to change the outcome by altering the
'burden of proof." A Justice tolerant of campaign reform can just as easily state
that the government's compelling state interest in maintaining the appearance
and reality of uncorruptability requires the plaintiff to prove that there is no
"appearance of impropriety in existing campaign finance activities."
The facts support a far more dismal interpretation of our existing political
system than Justice Breyer's rosy image. Consider the following report from
Barron's, published immediately after the 1996 elections:
Republican Alfonse D'Amato of New York, chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, will drop his Whitewater hearings in return for
Clinton support for sweeping banking reforms. Legislation sought by
D'Amato would not only knock down barriers between banks and
securities firms, but would help D'Amato raise campaign funds from
the financial-services industry in time for his 1998 re-election bid.
104
The news from the elected branches is equally outrageous. Whenever they hear
enough complaints from their focus groups and advisors, every Presidential
candidate and many Congressional candidates will suddenly support
campaign reform. But after the election is over, the system fails to produce any
real "reform," except for "reforms" that amplify the power of politicians'
wealthy patrons. In 1996, before the Court came to the wealthy's rescue by
immunizing party donations from meaningful legislative oversight, Congress
sought to permit individuals to donate up to three hundred thousand dollars
to political parties.
It is easy to envision this Supreme Court soon permitting corporations to
donate billions to political parties. According to the Court, corporations are
"persons" deserving significant First Amendment rights. There is no
"principled" way to distinguish individuals from corporations. The Court's
political maneuvers in this field should be a central issue in every upcoming
election; the Court should be very deferential to this part of the democratic
103 See, e.g., John F. Harris, Clinton Backs FEC on Funding Request, WASH. POST, April
18, 1997, at A13.
104 Jim McTague, Center Cut, BARRON'S, Nov. 11, 1996, at 15.
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process. In our modem society, what question can be more "political" than the
proper relationship between money and politics? Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's increasing surveillance of this major political issue allows Congress to
avoid its constitutional responsibilities. Because of cases like Buckley, Congress
can not do much, even if the electorate pressured them to truly reform the laws.
This line of cases that protect wealthy candidates and wealthy donors clashes
with Justice Holmes' warning in Lochner that the Court should stay out of most
political/economic disputes. The Court's doctrine constitutionally increases
the power of the wealthy at the expense of the rest of us. These cases
demonstrate how the Court has not only failed to resist the increasing power
of the affluent, but also has actually strengthened their position. One very
rarely hears a modem "conservative" lamenting this form of judicial activism,
activism that cannot be explained in terms of text, history, or tradition. It is also
a ludicrous fiction to believe that money does not tend toward a point of view.
Money likes capitalism very much. More particularly, most rich people love
more money. Money may talk, but it is not speech. Basic contract law should
remind us that giving away money is a form of conduct called a "gift." Nor does
the Internal Revenue Service look at gifts as unregulatable "speech."
What is the solution? Given the tawdry record of all three branches on this
issue, the body politic should make campaign financing a non-negotiable
concern. The people should put pressure on their leaders to change the system
through laws and judicial appointments. They should stop obsessing for
awhile about such important, divisive issues as affirmative action,
homosexuality, abortion, gun control, and term limits-at least until they get
their electoral system back. The major question at forthcoming Supreme Court
nomination proceedings should be the nominee's views on campaign
financing. If the public thought revising campaign spending were of primary
importance, Justice Breyer would never have been confirmed. The optimal
solution would be to pass a constitutional amendment, which could either give
Congress complete discretion or provide some guidelines to limit that
discretion. 105 Of course, such progressive actions would only be a prelude to
continuing class conflict. The rich had special "access" to the government long
before they could overtly buy it. In 1795, wealthy land speculators bribed the
state legislature to sell them millions of acres for as little as one and a half cents
per acre. 106 Chief Justice Marshall did not void the scheme in Fletcher v. Peck.107
Marshall's decision was arguably "rightly" decided. But ever since, private
power knew it could raid the public sector with relative impunity, gaining such
valuables as land, subsidies, and exclusive rights to use public airways.
105 Ex-Senator Bill Bradley is presently leading a coalition proposing such an
Amendment; see Albert R. Hunt, Politics and People: The GOP's Special Interest Protection
Campaign Bill, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at A13.
106 C. PETER MAGRATH, YAzoo: THE CASE OF FEcHER V. PECK 15 (1966).
10710 U.S. 87 (1810).
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Perhaps the Court should be more active in limiting the wealthy and its two
allies, the Republican and Democratic Parties. The Court could require more
fair, open, and diverse political debate. For example, it could characterize the
private sector's control of the media airways and cable as a "public function."
In Marsh v. State ofAlabama,108 the Supreme Court held that a Jehovah's Witness
had the constitutional right to deliver leaflets on private property in a privately
owned town. Because of the scope of its dominion, that town had assumed a
"public function," which required it to permit constitutionally protected speech
on its private property. The modem communications industry's control of the
airways resembles a company town. In addition, the public owns the airways;
they should not have to rely completely on the market to determine what they
need and want to hear. To quote Chief Justice Rehnquist, the private media
should be forced to take "the bitter with the sweet."10 9 The Court might even
require the airways to simultaneously broadcast some political speeches,
debates, and presentations from a wide range of political parties to enhance
"representation reinforcement." 110 Admittedly, a lot of people would turn off
their televisions. But that, too, could be a benefit.
Holmes' constitutional jurisprudence provides a compromise for those who
find such judicial redirection inappropriate. Even if the Court should not
aggressively interpret the Constitution to constrain the power of the rich, it
should stay out most of the time. At a minimum, it should be very deferential
to the elected branches' regulation of campaign financing. The Court should
mainly insure access to the political process for the poor and minor political
parties to prevent the two existing parties from becoming a perpetual duopoly.
Aggressive First Amendment intervention is only warranted when the
government has engaged in "particularized viewpoint discrimination." For
example, the Court should overrule a campaign finance statute that prevented
a single group, such as Ross Perot's Reform Party, from raising or spending any
money.
Constitutional doctrine is a crude instrument, difficult to formulate and even
more difficult to change. The Bork and Thomas nominations should remind all
of us why we need to keep the Court somewhat above ordinary political
disputes. The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the "rule of law" are
powerful adhesives that help keep our diverse, contentious society from
disintegrating. The Constitution left resolution of most economic issues to the
body politic, as should be the case. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly protects
individual private property rights in several passages yet says nothing about
the overall distribution of wealth. When it comes to regulating the economy,
Congress and its administrative agencies have a much better capacity to
respond to subtle distinctions within the economy, changes in circumstances,
and shifts in public opinion.
108326 U.S. 501 (1946).
109Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153 (1974).
llOSee, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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C. Anti-trust Law
The entire judicial review equation changes when the Supreme Court
interprets a statute regulating economic issues. The Court is no longer
constrained by the rigidity of Constitutional doctrine. An elected legislative
majority and President can effectively reverse any judicial doctrine by
amending the relevant statute. Consequently, the Chomsky-inspired model of
judicial review becomes much more compelling when applied to statutory
interpretation.
Once again, the Supreme Court has fallen short of its constitutional
obligations. Congress has already directly delegated to the Court tremendous
power and authority to prevent corporate abuses. In 1890, Congress passed the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act in response to public outrage over myriad corporate
wrongdoings. Its sponsor, Senator Sherman, analogized consolidated
corporate power to tyranny:
If the concentrated powers of this combination are entrusted to a single
man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government,
and should be subject to the strong resistance of the state and national
authorities.... [This Act will] enforce, by civil process in the courts of
the United States, the common law against monopolies. How is such
a law to be construed? Liberally, with a view to promote its object.11
That statute not only mandates that the Court battle corporate malfeasances,
but also provides the Court with sufficient authority, discretion, and remedies
to make significant reforms. Its conclusory language leaves many normative,
political choices to the Court: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
The supporters of the Anti-Trust Act were concerned about many forms of
corporate abuse, not merely a single person's domination of a corporation or
market. When the Supreme Court did not initially interpret the Act "liberally,"
Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914 to require the Court to become more
aggressive.
Under a broad reading of statutory text and supporting legislative history,
one can argue that Congress passed the two Anti-Trust Acts to delegate
sufficient power and responsibility to the federal courts to resist many (perhaps
even all) aspects of corporate aggression. The Court's basic doctrine in this
field-the "rule of reason"-is inherently flexible and policy-laden. We will
always disagree about which actions are substantively unreasonable.
Consequently, one can appropriately criticize the Court for failing to use this
power to sufficiently battle the increasing consolidation of private power over
the last one hundred years.l12 Of course, Congress also has not fulfilled its
11121 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
112 0n the other hand, the Court would need far more direction and support from
Congress to launch a thorough attack on existing corporate abuses.
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constitutional obligations; it should to draft new legislation to reverse the
Court's expanding deference to corporate power.
The Court should develop Anti-Trust doctrine that limits the concentrations
of wealth and power in so few hands. At the least, it should revive and
strengthen discarded doctrines that limited market share. The Court also could
formulate a broader conception of "unreasonable" business practices. For
example, it could start by blocking Westinghouse Electric's plan to gain greater
control of the radio market.11 3 If we are opposed to "kingly prerogatives," we
should be particularly wary of any single person's or group's control of
information.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court again interpreted the First Amendment to protect vast
private power in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications
Commission.114 The EC.C. had attempted to require Turner Broadcasting to
include all broadcast television stations on its cable systems so those stations
would not go out of business, thereby depriving non-paying customers of any
television. To justify her opinion that cable television is a private forum largely
immune from governmental regulation, Justice O'Connor stated: "But the First
Amendment as we understand it today rests on the premise that it is
government power, rather than private power, that is the main threat to free
expression."
It is this basic premise-the government is always to be feared more than
the private sector-which Chomsky's critique calls into question. Admittedly,
the government remains the ultimate threat against free expression. It has much
more coercive power than any private entity. But in the meantime, private
power can so manipulate public opinion and personal livelihoods that it seizes
effective control of government. In other words, perverse distribution of wealth
and power provides an opportunity for perverse control of governmental
power.
This is not a paranoid fantasy. In the 1990s, Italy elected as its leader the
Neo-Fascist Berlusconi, who owned many of Italy's privately held television
networks. During his campaign he had used that power to persuade many
voters that he had their interests at heart. His television channels became
propaganda machines. Perhaps such a thing can't happen here even though
Ross Perot's first presidential campaign suggests otherwise. 115 But the
113Westinghotuse, Infinity Deal Sets Stage For Other Radio Groups Seeking Mergers, WALL
ST. J., June 21, 1996, at A3.
114114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
115Chomsky believes that to a certain degree "it" has already happened here. For
instance, the corporate media have consistently supported government policies abroad
(which in turn usually benefit other corporate entities); see generally, HERMAN &
CHoMsKY, MANUFACrURING CONSENT, supra note 5. More recently, powerful interests
have received many billions of dollars via the Savings and Loan Bailout, the cellular
19961
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Supreme Court should not prevent Congress, the people's representative, from
taking necessary measures to prevent such a disaster.
phone service giveaway, the recent Telecommunications Act, and numerous other
"low-interest" loans and direct subsidies.
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